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Guard Sets in Tor using AS Relationships
Abstract: The mechanism for picking guards in Tor
suffers from security problems like guard fingerprinting
and from performance issues. To address these issues,
Hayes and Danezis proposed the use of guard sets, in
which the Tor system groups all guards into sets, and
each client picks one of these sets and uses its guards.
Unfortunately, guard sets frequently need nodes added
or they are broken up due to fluctuations in network
bandwidth. In this paper, we first show that these break-
ups create opportunities for malicious guards to join
many guard sets by merely tuning the bandwidth they
make available to Tor, and this greatly increases the
number of clients exposed to malicious guards. To ad-
dress this problem, we propose a new method for form-
ing guard sets based on Internet location. We construct
a hierarchy that keeps clients and guards together more
reliably and prevents guards from easily joining arbi-
trary guard sets. This approach also has the advantage
of confining an attacker with access to limited locations
on the Internet to a small number of guard sets. We sim-
ulate this guard set design using historical Tor data in
the presence of both relay-level adversaries and network-
level adversaries, and we find that our approach is good
at confining the adversary into few guard sets, thus lim-
iting the impact of attacks.
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1 Introduction
Tor allows clients to create anonymous connections to
their desired destinations via three-hop encrypted chan-
nels called circuits. A circuit is built over a path of three
relays, an entry, a middle, and an exit, selected from
among the thousands of volunteer relays distributed
across the globe. In Tor, no single relay in the circuit
nor any third party in the network should be able to
link the source with the destination.
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Since relays are run by volunteers, however, it re-
mains a risk that multiple relays on a circuit are run by a
single entity who could then break the user’s anonymity.
In fact, if all relays on the circuit were picked at random
every time, a Tor user would be rolling the dice with
her privacy every few minutes. Most circuits would be
fine, but eventually she would roll a pair of malicious
relays and lose her anonymity. To prevent the majority
of users from getting compromised, Tor fixes the client’s
entry node to be the same in every circuit for up to nine
months. If this entry node, called a guard, is honest and
does not get compromised, then the client’s identity can-
not be directly discovered by malicious relays while the
guard is still being used [37].
A key design decision around the use of guards is
how to assign guards to users. If a user picks a guard
with very low bandwidth, as an extreme example, then
not only will her performance be poor over an extended
period of time, she may be the only user regularly us-
ing that guard and can thus be profiled [19, 29, 31, 33].
This is known as guard fingerprinting. More generally,
there are several anonymity and performance consider-
ations for picking guards that have only recently been
explored [8, 10, 13, 15].
One solution to the guard fingerprinting problem is
to group all guards into guard sets [13] and have each
client pick one of the guard sets and use the guards
in this guard set for the first hop on all of its circuits.
Hayes and Danezis [18] proposed the first guard set algo-
rithm for use in Tor. This algorithm uses guard relays’
bandwidth as the key criterion in forming guard sets,
such that all sets have almost the same amount of band-
width. They also presented techniques for maintaining
the guard sets when there is churn.
Contributions. In this paper, we first demonstrate
that the algorithms proposed by Hayes and Danezis
have vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to compro-
mise many guard sets in the presence of churn over time
(§3). In particular, we describe attacks that leverage the
fact that the attacker controls the amount of bandwidth
it makes available for a given guard node. With these
attacks, a low-bandwidth adversary controlling 1% of
total guard bandwidth can infiltrate around 40% of all
guard sets within four months, and a high-bandwidth
adversary controlling around 25% of total guard band-
width can infiltrate 90% of guard sets.
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To address these issues, we propose a new guard set
design (§4) that uses location in the Internet topology
as the basis for building a hierarchy on top of the sets.
Using this hierarchy, sets are built and maintained us-
ing guards that are topologically close to each other in
the Internet. This limits an attacker’s ability to compro-
mise guard sets beyond whatever Internet locations he
has access to. While bandwidth can be easily manipu-
lated, many potential attackers will have a limit on the
possible Internet locations of their guards.
We evaluate the security of this approach against at-
tackers who control a fraction of the guards, with vary-
ing resource levels, using one network in the Internet
(§5.1.1). Against a single malicious guard, the compro-
mise rate after one year of running the attack is 0.044%
compared to 0.076% for the prior approach. Against an
attacker who controls 10% of Tor’s guard bandwidth,
the compromise rate compared to the prior approach
dropped from 53% to 10% after one year and less than
half of the rate for the current Tor design (23%). Against
a botnet adversary, which inherently has a presence in
more AS locations, the compromise rate fell from 53%
to 37% compared to the prior approach after one year.
Moreover, the fraction of compromised targets in our
approach dropped from 98% to 44% compared to the
prior approach in a targeted attack scenario (§5.1.2).
We also evaluate our approach against attackers
who control one Autonomous System (AS) in the Inter-
net (§5.1.3). We find that our approach has very similar
results to both Tor and the prior work. Additionally,
we merge our guard set design with DeNASA [9], a re-
cently proposed AS-aware path selection algorithm, and
show that the rate of streams being vulnerable to attack
drops 80%.
Beyond this, we evaluate a number of other as-
pects of the proposed design (§5.2), including the sizes
of anonymity sets, the bandwidth distribution among
guard sets, and network performance. We conclude with
a discussion (§6) of deployment and other issues to be
addressed in future work.
2 Background
In this section, we briefly overview the AS structure of
the Internet and the Tor anonymity system, and we then
discuss related work.
2.1 Autonomous Systems
Our approach makes use of the structure of the Internet
topology, so we describe the necessary concepts here.
AS2 AS4AS3
AS5 AS6 AS7 AS8 AS9 AS10 AS11 AS12
AS1
AS13 AS14
Fig. 1. Customer cones: The dashed lines show customer
cones, the solid arrows are provider-to-customer links.
The network layer of the Internet is composed of
Autonomous Systems (ASes) that are linked together by
high bandwidth lines and fast routers. Each AS is owned
and operated by one authority, such as a government,
university, or Internet service provider. ASes contain a
set of servers that are linked together in a LAN and are
assigned IPs from an IP prefix that is unique to that par-
ticular AS. Relationships among ASes have been formed
based on a variety of economic and political constraints.
Using publicly available BGP table data, Gao [17] in-
troduced a method that abstracts these relationships
in three types: customer-to-provider (c2p), provider-to-
customer (p2c), and peer-to-peer (p2p). In a c2p or p2c
relationship, the customer provides monetary payment
to the provider in exchange for the provider providing
bandwidth to the customer. In a p2p relationship, the
two ASes save monetary resources by exchanging traffic
between one another on a quid-pro-quo basis.
Viewing ASes and their relationships in graph the-
oretic terms, we have a forest of trees, with backbone
providers at the root nodes and customers as leaves. We
can then define a customer cone, the set of ASes that
can be reached from the root AS by only following the
p2c links. For example, AS A’s customer cone consists
of AS A plus AS A’s customers, plus AS A’s customers’
customers and so on [27]. Figure 1 shows an example of
how customer cones work, where AS1 has the biggest
cone in the example and contains all the ASes shown,
while AS8 has only AS13 and AS14 in its customer cone.
The number of ASes in a customer cone and the num-
ber of unique IP prefixes advertised by these ASes are
good metrics for ranking the size and importance of an
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AS [12]. Our guard set design groups the guard ASes
that are in the same customer cone in the same set.
The underlying customer cone in our design can be
built by different methods. The main requirement for
our system are that the cones should be relatively sta-
ble over time compared with bandwidth fluctuations in
the guard sets. We chose to use the recursive customers
method [12, 27]. In this method, the customer cone of
each AS is built by recursively visiting ASes reachable
from that by p2c links. The customer cone of an AS is a
subtree of customer ASes that can be reached from that
AS. The size of a customer cone is the number of cus-
tomer ASes in that cone. For the the customer cones in
our experiments, we use the AS relationships provided
by CAIDA for July 2015 [11].
2.2 Tor Overview
Tor is a volunteer-operated network that provides
anonymity and privacy online. Tor has about 2 mil-
lion daily users and 7,000 relays. Relays in Tor network,
called Onion Routers (ORs), are run by volunteers who
donate their bandwidth. ORs provide information about
their donated bandwidth, IP address and ports, and exit
policies—the addresses and ports they are willing to be
connected to external Internet destinations—to a small
group of servers called directory authorities. The direc-
tory authorities assign flags to some of the ORs based on
their availability, bandwidth and exit policies and then
they mutually agree upon a list called the consensus of
all the information about all the ORs.
A Tor client, called the Onion Proxy (OP), first con-
tacts one of directory authorities or their mirrors and
downloads the consensus to get the current status of the
Tor network. Since the Tor network is dynamic, with
relays regularly joining and leaving, the directory au-
thorities update the consensus hourly. The OP uses the
consensus information to select a path of three relays to
use in communicating with its destinations.
Once the OP picks this path of ORs, it then sets
out to build a circuit of layered cryptographic connec-
tions through this path. Since relays in the circuits are
selected from all the volunteer relays, it is possible that
an adversary, who runs some guard or exit relays in
the network, sits in the exit and entry position of some
path. Such an adversary can observe the entry and exit
traffic, correlate them, and link the client to her desti-
nations [19, 24, 29, 35]. If the client chooses new relays
for each circuit, she will eventually build a circuit in
which the adversary’s relays are in its entry and exit
positions. To reduce the occurrence of this attack, Tor
clients stick to using a single guard relay for the first
relay on every path for months [13]. Guards should thus
be stable, so that the client can rely on the guard to be
available whenever it connects to Tor, and reasonably
high bandwidth to prevent the guard from becoming a
significant bottleneck to performance.
Directory servers keep track of relays’ bandwidth
and availability in the network and assign Guard flags
to the relays that have the following criteria [8]:
– Have been continuously running for longer than
12.5% of the relays or at least eight days.
– Advertise bandwidth more than the median band-
width of all the relays, or 2.0 MBps.
– Have a weighted-fractional-uptime (WFU)1 of more
than the median of all relays’ WFU or 98% WFU.
2.3 Related Work
Elahi et al. [15] developed a framework called COGS
to study guard selection schemes in Tor and evaluated
the impact of churn, guard rotation, and the size of the
guard list on clients’ anonymity. Their results show that
guard rotation exposes the users to more guards, in-
creasing the chance of picking malicious guards. On the
other hand, they find that guard rotation offers better
load balancing on guards, better utilization of recently
joined guards, and regaining the privacy of clients stuck
using malicious guards. If Tor rotates the guards, they
report, then larger guard lists lead to more compromises
of anonymity; without guard rotation, larger guard lists
lead to fewer compromises. They also find that larger
guard lists lead to better, fairer performance.
Johnson et al. [24] evaluate the vulnerability of
Tor to passive end-to-end correlation attacks from both
relay- and network-level adversaries, with the settings
used prior to 2014 of three guards rotated after 30 to 60
days. They define metrics that give us the probability
of path compromise for a given user and the probability
of time to the first compromise. They developed a path
simulator that mimics the Tor client and implements
multiple models of user activity, such as Web users and
BitTorrent clients. They found that relay-level adver-
saries can maximize their resources by allocating more
bandwidth to malicious guards than to malicious exits.
Against an adversary running one 83.3 MBps guard re-
1 WFU is the percentage of the time that relay has been up,
adjusted with a decay of 5% per every 12 hours the relay is off.
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lay and one 6.7 MBps exit relay, they find that 80%
of users will be compromised within six months. Con-
sidering network-level adversaries, they find that an AS
adversary can compromise 38% of Tor streams in three
months, and a IXP adversary can compromise 20% of
streams in the same period. We implement our guard
selection scheme in their path simulator to analyze the
security of our design at the network level.
Based on the results from Elahi et al. and Johnson et
al., Dingledine et al. [13] conclude that the guard selec-
tion mechanism in use prior to 2014 harmed users’ secu-
rity. Instead of using three guards for 30 to 60 days, they
proposed using a single guard for nine to ten months.
They note that, based on Elahi et al’s findings, this pro-
posal will provide stronger anonymity but suffers from
poor performance and poor load balancing, as the newly
joined guards will be underutilized. To fix these flaws,
Dingledine et al. suggest raising the bandwidth bar in
assigning guard flags from 250 KBps to 2MBps and
having underutilized guards act as middle nodes. These
changes were implemented in Tor and are still in effect
as of the time of writing.
Dingledine el at. also suggested the idea of guard
sets [13], which Hayes and Danezis [18] then expanded
into a full proposal and evaluation. The Hayes and
Danezis design puts the guards into sets based on their
bandwidths, such that each set has approximately the
same bandwidth. Although this approach is intuitive,
we show in the following section how it leads to vulner-
abilities that we then address in our proposed design.
3 Attacking Guard Sets
With guard sets, the directory authorities put all the
guards into sets and include this assignment in the con-
sensus [13]. The client randomly picks a guard set to use
for a long period of time and then picks the guard for
each circuit randomly from the selected set. The main
advantage of this scheme is that it puts all the clients
using a given guard set into one anonymity set, such
that a guard fingerprinting attack could only identify
one as a member of the set.
3.1 Hayes and Danezis Design
Hayes and Danezis performed the first detailed study
of the guard set idea, and they propose algorithms for
how to build guard sets, assign users to those sets, and
maintain the sets as the Tor network changes [18]. To
ensure load balancing, their proposal uses bandwidth
as the main criteria to build the sets. In particular, it
first uses the bandwidth values from the consensus to
generate bandwidth quanta, where each quantum repre-
sents a block of bandwidth from a single guard node.
Using an empirically selected threshold of 40 MBps, a
guard’s bandwidth is divided into multiple quanta such
that each quantum is above the threshold. A guard that
has bandwidth BW generates bBW40 c quanta, meaning
that guards with less than 80 MBps bandwidth make
up just one quantum. For example, if we have guards
with bandwidths of 10, 70, and 90 MBps, we get quanta
10, 70, 45, and 45 MBps. The bandwidth quanta then
are sorted from largest to smallest.
To build guard sets, the algorithm goes through the
sorted list of quanta and moves one quantum at a time
from the head of the list to the current set until the total
bandwidth of the set reaches the threshold of 40 MBps.
Then the current set is added to the list of sets, and
a new set is started. If the leftover bandwidth quanta
in the sorted list make up less than 40 MBps, they are
not used to build sets and do not contribute to any
guard sets. The goal of sorting the quanta list is to put
guard nodes with similar bandwidth in the same set,
and it also forces an attacker with many low-bandwidth
guards into fewer sets with similar bandwidths instead
of being spread out into sets with mixed bandwidths.
Over time, the total guard bandwidth in Tor fluc-
tuates, as some new guards join the network and others
go offline. These changes affect the bandwidth of guard
sets and the available bandwidth quanta. To address
this, the strategy of Hayes and Danezis is to first re-
pair damaged guard sets with bandwidth of less than
20 MBps. When repairing a given damaged set, the al-
gorithm finds the leftover bandwidth quanta that fall
between between 50% to 100% of the maximum guard
bandwidth of the set. This list of quanta is called the
candidate list of the set. Quanta from the candidate list
are added to the set one by one until the set’s total
bandwidth exceeds 40 MBps. Once all damaged guard
sets are repaired, the algorithm builds a new guard set
from any remaining leftover quanta if their combined
bandwidth is more than 40 MBps.
3.1.1 Vulnerabilities
Using bandwidth similarity to repair the sets opens a
door for the attacker. The primary issue is that the at-
tacker can identify guard sets that are close to break-
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ing, i.e. around 20 MBps, and then add guards or tune
his guards’ bandwidths to have similar bandwidths. For
example, if the vulnerable guard set has guards with
bandwidths of 3–4 MBps, and the attacker has an un-
used guard with 5 MBps bandwidth, he can set it to
offer a maximum of 3.5 MBps to Tor. Once these sets
break, the repair algorithm will include the adversary’s
guards to be in the candidate list, increasing its chances
of joining a particular set. Additionally, the attacker can
create new compromised guard sets by adding his guards
to the network or tuning their bandwidth so that the to-
tal bandwidth of leftover quanta and his guards is above
40 MBps, causing the algorithm to build a new set.
Another issue is that a guard set is not considered
in need of repair if its bandwidth is at least 20 MBps.
This means that as soon as the adversary joins a set, it
can reduce the allocated guard bandwidth to the least
possible value for being a guard, which can be as low
as 2 MBps as long as the set’s total bandwidth remains
above 20 MBps. This can save the adversary’s resources.
Also, if an attacker gets one of his guards into a set, it
will remain in that set forever even if all the other guards
in the set are gone. This allows the attacker to retain a
full guard sets’ allocation of users while only using half
of the bandwidth needed for building a new set.
3.2 Evaluation
We investigate the impact of these vulnerabilities on the
adversary’s ability to infiltrate guard sets and compro-
mise Tor users. Jamie Hayes provided us with his im-
plementation of the Hayes-Danezis algorithms for guard
sets. We used their implementation and exploited the
possible vulnerabilities in simulation.
3.2.1 Attacker Model
The goal of the attacker is to get into as many guard sets
as possible and thereby compromise a large fraction of
users. We run the Hayes-Danezis algorithm using con-
sensus documents from January to May 2013, the same
time period used by Hayes and Danezis for consistency.
Like Hayes and Danezis [18], in all of our simulations we
used the first consensus documents of each day, instead
of hourly consensus updates, to allow for longer studies.
We allow the attacker to add his guard relays to the
network in the second day of simulation after the guard
sets are formed, and the attacker aims to both get into
new sets and into previously built sets.
We assume that the attacker has access to the
guard relays’ bandwidths, which he can obtain from the
consensus and refine if necessary by periodic measure-
ments. The attacker also keeps track of the assignment
of guards to guard sets, which is also available in the
consensus. The attacker uses this information to follow
the sets’ bandwidth and detect which sets are about to
break. If a set is about to break and the set is already
compromised, the attacker tunes his bandwidth to keep
the set alive by keeping the set’s bandwidth above 20
MBps. Otherwise, if a set is broken and not yet com-
promised, the attacker adds new guards to the network
with bandwidths tuned to get added to the set’s candi-
date list. Instead of adding new guard relays to the net-
work, the attacker can reuse his unused guard relays and
tune their bandwidth. If the attacker observes new sets
are forming from leftover guards, the attacker adds new
guards or re-uses his guards in the leftover quanta and
tunes their bandwidth to get to the list of candidates
for the new set. Because the quantum in the candidate
list of a set are in descending order, The attacker only
needs to tune his guard relay bandwidth slightly higher
than the last bandwidth in the list which fixes the set.
In our simulations, we assume the attacker can add
the new guards the same day he needs them. Note that
the new sets are created and broken sets are repaired
whenever there is enough bandwidth or a set is bro-
ken, but the changes are announced in the next con-
sensus file. Also, the attacker’s relays must be assigned
the guard flag by the authorities. To do this, the at-
tacker can run some relays that have all the criteria
to get the guard flag (as listed in Section 2.2) except
for one. For example, the attacker can run relays with
high uptime but with bandwidth less than the minimum
bandwidth required (currently 2 MBps), which saves his
bandwidth while waiting for a set to break. When the
attacker needs a new guard, he just needs to increase
the bandwidth of the relay to get the Guard flag. An-
other technique would be for the attacker, who typically
would run exit nodes to perform end-to-end correlation
attacks together with his guards, to switch one of his
exits to being a guard. This is easily done by first hav-
ing a high-uptime relay with an exit policy, which will
cause it to have the Exit-Guard flag, but it will be used
exclusively as an exit due to exits being the bandwidth
bottleneck in Tor. Then, to switch it to a guard, the
attacker simply removes the exit policy.
We used two adversary models, a high-bandwidth
adversary who controls about 25% of Tor’s bandwidth
and a low-bandwidth adversary who controls about 1%.
The actual bandwidths being used by the adversary vary
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Fig. 2. Hayes-Danezis: The fraction of compromised sets and fraction of the adversary’s bandwidth to the total guard bandwidth
over time, as shown by the solid lines in Fig. 2. For
both models, when the adversary gets into a guard set,
he reduces his relay’s bandwidth as long as the total
bandwidth of the set remains above 20 MBps. In the
low-bandwidth adversary model, the adversary leaves a
set if he is the set’s main resource provider, which we
define as providing more than 90% of the set’s band-
width. In compromising the guard sets, the adversary
needs to have only one guard in the set to compromise
all the clients attached to that set. If more than one
adversary guard is assigned to a set, the adversary will
pull one of his guards from that set to inject it into the
other set.
We assume that the attacker knows exactly when
guard relays will break. In reality, however, the attacker
will spend additional resources waiting for guard sets
that are close to 20MBps to break. Also, the attacker
may miss some guard sets that have sudden large drops
in bandwidth. Thus, the results of our experiment rep-
resent an upper bound of compromised sets for a given
amount of attacker resources.
3.2.2 Results
Figure 2 shows the upper bound of the fraction of com-
promised sets and the ratio of the adversary’s band-
width to the total guard bandwidth in Tor for the first
half of 2013. As shown in Figure 2a, a high-bandwidth
adversary who owns around 25% of the total guard
bandwidth in the Tor network can compromise more
than 90% of all the guard sets (and thus be a guard
for over 90% of all the clients) in just four months. Fig-
ure 2b shows that a low bandwidth adversary with only
1% of total guard bandwidth can compromise around
40% of all the guard sets in just four months. Large
fluctuations in the graph are due to large drops in guard
bandwidth that occurred in early March and mid-April.
Our attacks shows that against the prior guard set de-
sign, an adversary with modest resources can endanger
the security of a large number of users.
4 Design
To mitigate the threat of an adversary compromising a
significant number of guard sets, we seek an approach
that is more resilient in the face of frequently changing
guard sets. In particular, the method should make it
harder for an attacker to join a targeted guard set in
need of repair and allow clients to keep as much of their
anonymity sets as possible, even when guard sets break.
To this end, we propose to take advantage of the relative
stability of the underlying Internet topology by linking
sets to customer cones. In this section, we first explain
our motivation for the design, and then we describe how
guards are grouped into sets using customer cones and
how guard sets are assigned to clients.
4.1 Motivation
To prevent the attacks we describe against the guard set
design of Hayes and Danezis in the previous section, we
need to prevent an attacker from easily joining arbitrary
guard sets. First, as Hayes and Danezis also argue [18],
we should maintain a hierarchy of guard sets, repre-
sented as a tree. This hierarchy dictates that when guard
sets are deleted, there is a pre-defined backup guard set
for the users of the old set to join. This keeps users to-
gether as much as possible, maintaining their anonymity
sets. Beyond the Hayes and Danezis proposal, we also
would have guards remain in the same place in the hier-
archy as much as possible. When a guard set is deleted,
the remaining guards should stay in the same general
area in the hierarchy, i.e. with siblings in the tree. Also,
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new guard sets should only be constructed from guards
in the same subtree. This prevents guards from attempt-
ing to move from one part of the tree to another.
The other major requirement of our approach is that
the attacker must not be able to place new nodes into
arbitrary locations in the hierarchy. A simple approach
would be to use a cryptographic hash of the node’s IP
address as an identifier, much like in a DHT. Unfortu-
nately, an attacker with even a fairly small range of IP
addresses to use could pick a number of different loca-
tions in the hierarchy by computing their hash values
in advance. If the directory server were to pick the lo-
cations of new guards randomly, the attacker could add
and remove nodes until the location suited his needs.
In our design, a guard’s place in the hierarchy and
guard set assignment is based on the guard’s network
location, meaning the AS it is in and that AS’s corre-
sponding place in the customer cones of the Internet.
For an adversary with high bandwidth capacity and a
range of IP addresses, but only a few network locations,
this would substantially limit the number of guard sets
he can join and the number of users that he can compro-
mise. To fully overcome this, the attacker would need to
be able to place guards into arbitrary network locations
that have guards. We argue that this attacker model
is unlikely in practice. A botnet-based attacker, for ex-
ample, will likely face challenges with the stability and
bandwidth requirements for guards. Even if enough sta-
ble bots can be found, the bot locations (such as con-
sumer ISPs) may not correlate well with the locations of
Tor guard nodes (which include professional hosting ser-
vices like OVH), and this further limits the guard sets he
can join. We discuss about hosting providers and their
impact on our design in Appendix A.
Overview. In the rest of this section, we describe our
proposed hierarchy. The hierarchy consists of three lev-
els: 1) Root Sets, 2) Branch Sets, and 3) Guard Sets.
A Root Set is a customer cone of a root AS that con-
tains guard ASes. Root Sets are broken into Branch Sets
and then further into Guard Sets. Branch Sets represent
smaller customer cones within the Root Set, in which all
guard ASes have the same provider. Finally, Guard Sets
are formed by selecting all guards within a Branch Set
and grouping the guards such that the number of ASes
within a Guard Set are minimized and the guard band-
width is above a threshold. Below, we describe each part
of the system in detail.
4.2 Root Sets
To form Root Sets, we first build a root set list – a list
of ASes sorted based on customer cone size in ascending
order. Initially, the root set list contains all ASes with
one or more guards (guard ASes), and each guard AS
is considered as a Root Set. Consider Figure 1 as an
example for this section, which means that the list would
be something like {AS13, AS14, AS5, AS6, AS7,AS9,
AS10, AS11, AS12}, assuming that only the leaf ASes
have guards. Then we choose the Root Set with the
smallest customer cone size, say AS13. We follow all
c2p links to discover all providers for this Root Set that
are also providers to at least one other Root Set in the
list, e.g. AS8, AS3, and AS1. Among these providers, we
select the provider with the smallest customer cone size,
e.g. AS8. This provider becomes the new Root Set and
is added to the root set list, while the Root Sets that
are in the customer cone of this provider (AS13 and
AS14) are removed from the root set list. This process
is repeated until all Root Sets in the root set list contain
guard bandwidths more than a bandwidth threshold τup
or the number of Root Sets in the list have decreased
below a threshold N . The pseudo-code of this process is
shown in Appendix F.
Updating Root Sets As new guard ASes join the
network, the algorithm first checks whether the new
guard ASes are in the customer cone of an existing Root
Set. If they are in an existing Root Set’s customer cone,
they are added to that Root Set. If there are still some
guard ASes that are not in any of the Root Sets’ cus-
tomer cones, they themselves are considered as Root
Sets. Then the above algorithm is run to reform the
Root Sets.
4.3 Branch Sets
Root Sets often represent large customer cones and
many guards. To better isolate groups of guards from
each other and make it harder for a malicious guard
to move into targeted guard sets, we break each Root
Set into Branch sets. In building Branch Sets, the goal
is to place guard ASes that are close together in the
AS relationship graph into the same Branch Set. To
this end, we first identify all customer cones within the
Root Set’s customer cone in which the guard bandwidth
reaches the threshold τup.2 Note that some cones will
2 This is the same threshold as used to make the Root Sets.
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Fig. 3. Branch Set creation. The dashed line shows Root
Set P ’s customer cone, the black circles are guard ASes, and
the solid lines show the customer cones with bandwidth τup or
greater.
be contained within other, larger cones, and there can
be overlaps between cones. Among all the possible cus-
tomer cones, we should pick cones such that their inter-
section with respect to guard ASes is empty (A∩B = ∅).
There may be many possible combinations of customer
cones that are independent in this way. Since our goal
is to have smaller customer cones to make it harder for
an attacker to join a targeted Branch Set, we pick the
combination that has the maximum number of indepen-
dent cones. Each of these independent cones will be a
Branch Set within the given Root Set. At the end, we
place all guard ASes that do not meet the requirements
for building Branch Set into one additional set.
Figure 3 shows an example of Branch Set creation
for Root Set P . There are seven customer cones with
sufficient bandwidth, but there are overlaps between
some of them. The possible combinations of indepen-
dent cones are {1, 3}, {3, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 7}, {1, 6, 7}, and
{4, 5, 6, 7}. Among these combinations, the algorithm
picks {4, 5, 6, 7} because it has the maximum number
of independent cones. This means that Root Set P has
four Branch Sets.
Updating Branch Sets. Guard bandwidth fluctuates
over time, causing some guard ASes to be dropped from
the Branch Set and others added, which requires peri-
odic updates. Our algorithm to update the Branch Set
first checks which of the new guard ASes are in our
current Branch Set’ customer cones. If a Branch Set’s
bandwidth is below threshold τdown, it dismantles the
Branch Set and releases its guard ASes. The algorithm
is then run again to build Branch Set from previous
Branch Set, new guard ASes, and released guard ASes.
4.4 Guard Sets
Once we have Branch Sets, we can break them up fur-
ther into the Guard Sets. We first randomly shuffle the
guard ASes in the Branch Set. Then we add one guard
at a time from the same AS to the current Guard Set
GAS2 GAS1 GAS3
141513151510251523228
Set
Fig. 4. Guard Set creation. Dashed ovals represent guard
ASes (GAS), rectangles represent Guard Sets, and circles rep-
resent guards. Numbers inside the circles are the guards’ band-
widths (MBps).
until the Guard Set’s bandwidth reaches the threshold
τup.
3 If we use all the guards in an AS, we continue
adding guards from the next guard AS.
Figure 4 shows an example of Guard Set creation.
The Branch Set’s customer cone includes three guard
ASes, GAS1, GAS2, and GAS3, and four Guard Sets
are formed. Note that a Guard Set can include all of the
guards in an AS (such as in GAS2), some of the guards
in an AS (such as the leftmost Guard Set in GAS1), or
guards from multiple ASes (the two rightmost Guard
Set).
Updating Guard Sets Guard Sets will need to be
updated over time due to the leaving and joining of
guard ASes and changes in bandwidth. If a Guard Set’s
bandwidth falls below the threshold, τdown4, we need
to repair that Guard Set to ensure load balancing. To
repair a low-bandwidth Guard Set, we add new guards
to it until the bandwidth reaches at least 40 MBps. We
first try to add new guards that are in the same AS,
and then add from other guard ASes in the Branch Set.
If there are still some unused new guards in the Branch
Set, we try to build new Guard Sets out of them.
4.5 Assigning Clients to the Guard Sets
A newly-joined client selects first a Root Set, then a
Branch Set from among the Branch Sets in her Root
Set, and finally a Guard Set from among the Guard
Sets in her Branch Set. Each of these selections is ran-
dom, weighted proportionally by bandwidth. To create
a circuit, the client picks one of the guards in her Guard
Set as the entry relay. The selection of guards from a
Guard Set can be weighted in favor of bandwidth or can
be done uniformly at random.
3 Again, this is the same threshold as used for Root Sets.
4 The same threshold as for updating Branch Sets
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As time passes, some guards leave the network, and
this causes some Guard Sets, Branch Sets, or even Root
Sets to be no longer available. If the client’s Guard
Set has been dismantled, the client will select another
Guard Set under her Branch Set. Similar recovery meth-
ods are available for Branch Sets and Root Sets. In the
worst case, if her Root Set is gone, the client acts like a
newly-joined client. The pseudocode for these processes
is shown in Appendix F.
5 Evaluations
In this section we evaluate different aspects of our guard
set design. We start by analyzing the security of the
proposed guard set design in the presence of relay- and
network-level adversaries. Then we monitor guard set
changes over time with respect to the number of guard
sets, guard set bandwidth, and client anonymity sets. In
our evaluation, we set bandwidth thresholds τup = 40
MBps and τdown = 20 MBps – the same as the thresh-
olds used by Hayes and Danezis [18]. We set the num-
ber of Root Sets to N = 50 to maintain enough Root
Sets and not to be merged into only top tier ASes. For
our data set, we use consensus documents from January
2015 to December 2015 from Tor Metrics [36]. Following
Hayes and Danezis, during the entire evaluation we do
not rotate the guards. Additionally, we compare our re-
sults to Hayes and Danezis’s design [18], which we refer
to as "BW design." We call our design "AS design."
5.1 Security Evaluation
Tor is known to be vulnerable to traffic correlation at-
tacks [19, 24, 26, 28, 35]. An adversary who observes
both entry and exit traffic can use the timing of pack-
ets to link clients to their destinations. Observing both
sides of Tor traffic can happen at the relay level or
the network level. At the relay level, an adversary run-
ning guard and exit nodes in the Tor network may
deanonymize clients whose circuits traverse the adver-
sary’s guard and exit relays. We examine two relay-level
attack scenarios, a non-targeted relay-level adversary
and a targeted relay-level adversary. At the network
level, the adversary controls some part of the network,
such as an Autonomous System (AS) or Internet Ex-
change Point (IXP), and can thus observe huge amounts
of traffic, including entry and exit traffic in Tor. In this
Feb April June Aug Oct Dec
0
0.5
1
·10−2
C
om
pr
om
ise
ra
te
BW design
AS design
Single Guard
Fig. 5. Low-resource adversary: the solid lines show the median
of compromised clients and the colored bands shows the area
between the first and third quantiles.
section, we examine the security of our guard set design
against both relay-level and network-level adversaries.
Security Claims. In this section, we seek to demon-
strate the following:
1. The compromise rate is lower for AS design com-
pared to BW design for a variety of relay-level ad-
versaries with varying resource levels and for both
non-targeted and targeted attacks.
2. The vulnerable stream rate is approximately the
same as both Tor and BW design against network-
level adversaries.
3. AS design is compatible with the DeNASA [9] AS-
aware path selection algorithm, and the combined
algorithms provide similar vulnerable stream rates
as DeNASA against network-level adversaries.
5.1.1 Non-Targeted Relay-Level Adversaries
A non-targeted relay-level adversary adds guard nodes
in the network to compromise guard sets. This adversary
does not target any specific guard set or client; his goal is
to compromise as many clients as possible, which means
joining as many guard sets as possible.
The adversary model. If a guard set contains one
compromised guard relay, we consider the entire guard
set to be compromised; all clients using that guard set
will be compromised because they eventually send traf-
fic through the compromised guard. This follows the
model of Hayes and Danezis [18]. We examine the re-
lationship between the amount of guard bandwidth the
attacker provides to the Tor network and his success
rate in compromising guard sets. For each of the guard
selection strategies, AS design, BW design, and Single
Guard (i.e. Tor), we assume that the adversary runs
some guard relays such that their total bandwidth adds
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up to 1%, 5%, or 10% of the total guard bandwidth of
Tor for different experiments.
Because AS design uses both bandwidth and AS
relationships, the adversary’s network (AS) matters as
well. Therefore, we analyze the security of our guard
set design under three attack strategies: a low-resource
adversary, a high-resource centralized adversary, and a
botnet adversary. In Tor, a client is considered compro-
mised if it chooses a malicious guard. We note that this
is not completely fair to the guard set designs, since a
single guard in Tor can compromise more of the user’s
traffic than any one member of a guard set in which
each guard is picked only part of the time. We allow the
adversary to inject malicious relays at the beginning of
the simulation before the 500,000 users that we simu-
late start picking their guards. Unlike the model used by
Hayes and Danezis [18], we assume that the adversary’s
guard relays remain up and available during the entire
simulation, which gives the adversary an advantage.
Low-resource adversary. In this attack strategy, we
assume that the adversary injects only a single guard
relay in the network. We randomly choose an AS for this
malicious guard and select its IP address randomly from
the IP range of the selected AS. We also randomly select
a bandwidth value from Tor guards’ bandwidths in the
consensus document. This malicious guard is added to
the network, and the simulation is run for the year of
consensus files. We repeat the simulation 50 times, with
a new malicious guard each time.
Figure 5 shows the median fraction of compromised
clients over 50 simulations. At the beginning of 2015,
the compromise rate of AS design is statistically similar
to BW design. The compromise rates of both AS design
and BW design are greater than Single Guard, because it
is assumed that a single malicious guard within a guard
set compromises all clients who choose that guard set.
Over time, the compromise rate in BW design grows
substantially from 0.036% to 0.076%, as the malicious
guard moves into different guard sets. On the other
other hand, AS design’s compromise rate only grows
from 0.032% to 0.044%. We note that the variance in
these results for low-resource adversaries is high, as seen
by the wide quartile bands, but the trends are consis-
tent. The growth of the compromise rate in AS design
is 37%, much smaller than the 110% growth in BW de-
sign. The reason for this is that in AS design, malicious
guards are quarantined inside a Branch Set within a
Root Set. By design, the malicious guard cannot infil-
trate guard sets that are outside of the malicious guard’s
Branch Sets. In contrast, in BW design, when the band-
width in the network changes or the malicious guard’s
bandwidth changes, the guard sets change and the ma-
licious guard moves from one guard set to another and
compromises additional guard sets over time.
High-resource centralized adversary. In our
model, the high-bandwidth adversary owns some relays
such that its total bandwidth is a considerable fraction
of the network’s total bandwidth. We assume that the
adversary is centralized, meaning that it injects all ma-
licious guards into a single AS. We select at random
one guard AS in which to add the malicious guard re-
lays, and we select their bandwidths randomly from live
Tor guard bandwidths. Such relays are added to the Tor
network until the target attacker bandwidth is reached.
The simulation is run 50 times, with a new guard AS
and new malicious relays each time.
Figure 6 shows the fraction of compromised clients
for three different guard selection schemes and three dif-
ferent adversarial bandwidth assumptions. As the ad-
versary’s bandwidth increases, the fraction of compro-
mised clients increases for all three schemes. BW design
has the largest fraction of compromised clients com-
pared to the other two schemes. In BW design, we ob-
served a significant increase in compromises in August
2015. We found that this was due to the large drop in
Tor guard bandwidth in August 2015. The daily guard
bandwidth in the Tor network, as shown in Figure 16 in
Appendix D, significantly decreased in August for a few
days. This triggered a significant churn in guard sets for
BW design that allowed malicious guards to infiltrate
more guard sets. This suggests that bandwidth changes
in the Tor network have a negative impact on security
for BW design due to its vulnerabilities.
After one year of simulation time, we observed sig-
nificantly higher growth in the fraction of compromised
clients for Single Guard compared to AS design for all
three adversarial models. For 1%, 5%, and 10% sim-
ulated adversarial bandwidth, the fraction of compro-
mised clients for Single Guard increased by 180%, 168%,
and 157% over one year, respectively. The fraction of
compromised clients for AS design remained almost con-
stant over one year. These results support our assertion
that AS design successfully constrains the adversary’s
guards to guard sets within the Branch Set and Root
Set. Moreover, clients do not rotate guard sets unless
their guard set is broken up. Even then, the client will
choose another guard set within its Branch Set and Root
Set. These characteristics allow the AS design to keep
the compromise rate low over time.
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Fig. 6. High-resource centralized adversary. Compromise rates for varying guard bandwidth controlled by the adversary. The
solid lines show the median of compromised clients and the colored bands show the area between the first and third quantiles.
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Fig. 7. Botnet adversary. Compromise rates for varying fractions of total guard bandwidth owned by the adversary.
We also explore how our results change for different
bandwidth thresholds τup and τdown in both AS design
and BW design. Figure 8 shows the compromise rates
for three different values of τup, while keeping τdown =
τup/2. The compromise rate of BW design increases sig-
nificantly as τup increases. On the last day of simulation,
for example, the compromise rate for τup = 60MBps
(τdown = 30MBps) is 0.42, a 44% increase over that
of τup = 30MBps (0.29). The guard sets in BW de-
sign are more prone to breaking for larger values of τup
and τdown, which causes more guard rotation and an
increased rate of compromise. For AS design, we ob-
serve only small changes in the compromise rate for
changing bandwidth thresholds. For τup = 60MBps
(τdown = 30MBps), the compromise rate goes from
0.056 on the first day to 0.068 on the last day of sim-
ulation, where the latter is only a 13% increase over
the compromise rate when τup = 30MBps (0.06). This
is due to the use of network location rather than band-
width as the key criteria for managing sets in AS design.
Note that for clarity, due to how close the results are,
Figure 8 only shows the results for τup = 40MBps.
Botnet adversary. This adversary is similar to the
high-resource centralized adversary, except the adver-
sary injects his guard relays from different guard ASes
instead of one guard AS. For each simulation, the adver-
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Fig. 8. High-resource centralized adversary. Compromise
rates as τup varies, τdown = τup/2, and the adversary controls
5% of guard bandwidth.
sary adds malicious guards to the network from different
guard Ases, selected randomly from all guard ASes, un-
til the desired bandwidth for adversary is reached. We
also repeat this simulation 50 times.
Figure 7 shows the fraction of compromised clients
for all three guard selection schemes in the presence of a
botnet adversary with different bandwidth fractions. We
see that the results for BW design and Single Guard do
not change compared to the high-resource centralized
adversary (Figure 6) because these two methods work
with bandwidth in either grouping guards or client as-
signments and do not use the guard ASes. Because the
adversary’s relays are in different ASes, however, he can
compromise many more guard sets in the AS design. As
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we see in the figures, AS design’s compromise rate in
this attack is higher than its compromise rate in Fig-
ure 6. Nevertheless, BW design’s compromise rate rises
much faster than AS design’s, which is almost constant
over time. This indicates that, although this adversary
can compromise many sets, the AS design is good at
stopping the propagation of the adversary’s impact on
the network. Single Guard has a compromise rate less
than the other two guard set designs, which is a trade-
off against the smaller anonymity sets provided by Sin-
gle Guard. The growth of compromise rate over a year
against Single Guard is 194%, 168%, and 155% for 1%,
5%, and 10% simulated adversarial bandwidth, respec-
tively. These compromise rate growths are much higher
than 62%, 17% and 22% growth seen against AS design
for 1%, 5%, and 10% simulated adversarial bandwidth,
respectively.
5.1.2 Targeted Attacks
The other case we examine is when the adversary targets
a specific client, adding guard relays to Tor with the goal
of getting added to the client’s guard set. The way AS
design builds and repairs the sets makes it harder for
the adversary to get into the targeted client’s guard set.
The adversary model. The attacker controls one or
more exit nodes and profiles a particular user of inter-
est based on her exit traffic. We assume that this ad-
versary can identify the client’s guard set. Given that
all clients know the assignment of guards to guard sets,
an adversary simply needs to run one Tor client to get
this mapping. It is more challenging to learn the as-
signment of the client of interest to her guard set. A
variety of attacks, however, reveal the clients’ guard re-
lays [16, 19, 30, 32, 33], and we assume that the attacker
uses one of these attacks successfully to identify one of
the guards and the corresponding guard set. Then, the
goal of the attacker is to get into this guard set.
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Fig. 10. AS level adversary. CDF of vulnerable stream rates
We simulated the attack for BW design and AS de-
sign. In the simulations, we select a target client and
assign a guard set to this target on the first day. Then
the adversary monitors the network, measures the guard
bandwidths, and waits until the target’s guard set is
about to break. We assume that the attacker can add
some guard relays whenever he chooses—we discuss the
validity of this assumption in Section 3.
Against AS design, when the target guard set is
broken, the attacker selects one of the guard ASes used
in that guard set as the AS from which he injects his
guard relays. The attacker finds all the broken guard
sets in which this AS belongs and computes the total
amount of bandwidth needed to fix all of those broken
guard sets. Then the attacker adds guard relays from the
chosen AS to the network until they reach the required
bandwidth. The attack against BW design proceeds as
described in Section 3.
We simulated the targeted attack for the course of
one year from January 2015 to December 2015. On the
first day, January 1, we added a target client and as-
signed a guard set to her based on the given guard
set assignment algorithm. Once the target guard set
is determined, we wait until the target guard set is
broken. We then add the adversarial relays to the net-
work and tune their bandwidth based on the bandwidth
needed to get into that set. We continue monitoring the
network, tuning the adversary’s bandwidth and adding
more guard relays as needed until the target is compro-
mised. When the target is compromised, the adversary
tunes his bandwidth to keep the guard set alive, i.e. the
target set’s bandwidth should not be less than τdown.
We repeat this process for 500 targeted clients.
Results. Figure 9 shows the cumulative fraction of
days it takes for the targeted clients to be compromised.
With BW design, almost all the targeted clients (98%)
were compromised within the year, and 50% of the tar-
gets were compromised within one month. AS design
protects clients better from the targeted attack, as just
44% of targets were compromised within the year. The
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reason for this is that if the target guard set is broken,
it is repaired by guard relays from ASes in the same
Branch Set. This limits the chances for the adversarial
AS to be picked to repair the set. Overall, we find that
clients in AS design are safer than in BW design.
5.1.3 AS-Level Adversaries
An adversary may be able to monitor network traffic
on one or more ASes or IXPs on the Internet and ob-
serve both sides of Tor circuits to link users with their
destinations. In this study, we consider a stream to be
vulnerable if both the entry and exit sides of the traffic
traverse the same AS. To examine the security of our
design at the AS level, we implemented the guard selec-
tion schemes in TorPS [24] and generated streams from
a set of clients to a set of destinations. Then we found
the AS paths on both the forward and reverse connec-
tions from client to guard, and exit to destination [35].
We had 6,000 clients connecting from 30 client ASes dis-
tributed over the top countries using Tor. To choose the
30 ASes, we first pick a country for a user based on the
distribution of users from the top countries according to
Tor Metrics [7]. We then check whether this country has
an AS in top client ASes list given by Edman et al [14]. If
so, we pick that AS and add it to our client AS list, and
remove that AS from the top client ASes list. Otherwise,
we randomly select an AS from that country and add it
to our client AS list. We keep selecting countries based
on the distribution of directly connected clients distri-
bution until we have 30 client ASes. Over one month of
simulation time (Feb. 2015), these clients generated 8
million streams for each guard selection mechanism.
Figure 10 shows the CDF of vulnerable stream rates
for clients using AS design, BW design, and Single
Guard. As shown, the fraction of vulnerable streams is
almost the same for the three guard selection mecha-
nisms with a median of 28%. Thus, AS design appears
to provide similar anonymity as Single Guard and BW
design against an AS-level adversaries.
We combined the guard selection schemes with De-
NASA [9], an AS-aware path selection algorithm. De-
NASA avoids paths with suspect ASes, mainly Tier 1
ASes that appear frequently on the entry and exit sides
of Tor traffic. We provide a brief overview of DeNASA in
Appendix E. As shown in Figure 10, after combining the
guard selection mechanisms with DeNASA, the median
vulnerable stream rate for both guard set designs and
Single Guard dropped 80% (from 0.28 to 0.05). Thus,
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and BW sets
we believe that AS design is compatible with DeNASA
for protecting against AS-level adversaries.
5.2 System Evaluation
We now examine dynamics in the number of sets, sets’
bandwidths, and anonymity sets.
System Claims. In this section, we seek to demon-
strate the following:
1. The hierarchy derived from the customer cones is
stable over time, with moderate changes to Branch
Sets and Guard Sets.
2. The anonymity sets of users are significantly higher
for AS design over Single Guard and approximately
the same as BW design.
3. Bandwidth is distributed sufficiently evenly between
guard sets in AS design to not create bottlenecks at
the guard or waste significant bandwidth.
4. Network performance in Tor is approximately the
same for AS design compared with Single Guard.
Guard Sets. Our guard set design includes Root Sets,
Branch Sets, and Guard Sets. Figure 11 shows the num-
ber of each of these elements over the year 2015. The
number of Root Sets was 48 and did not change through-
out the experiment. The number of Branch Sets changed
modestly over time, ranging from 76 to 92 with an av-
erage of 84. This shows that the customer cones that
make up the Branch Sets do not change greatly over
time. Guard Sets increased over time because they are
built at the relay level and based on relay bandwidth.
Figure 16 shows the daily guard bandwidth in the Tor
network, and we observe three significant increases in
bandwidth: in late February, late June, and early Oc-
tober. These increases in bandwidth correspond closely
with the increase of guard sets in Figure 11. During our
simulations, on average 15 guard sets in AS design got
repaired each day, compared with seven guard sets in
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BW design. AS design often adds guards from broken
sets to existing sets, and this counts as a “repair” of the
existing set.
Anonymity Sets. We define an anonymity set as a
set of clients that use the same set of guards. If the
size of the anonymity set is small, then the threat of
the guard fingerprinting and statistical disclosure at-
tacks increase. To evaluate the anonymity set sizes in
our design, we use our client assignment mechanism de-
scribed in Section 4.5 to attach clients to guard sets.
In this experiment, we model 2,000,000 clients, which is
approximately the number of Tor daily users [36].
We compare the anonymity set sizes in AS design
with the ones in BW design and Tor (Single Guard).
Figure 12 shows the empirical CDF of anonymity set
sizes. The median anonymity set size in AS design
(7300 clients) is almost the same as BW design (7700
clients), and both are far larger than in Tor currently
(970 clients). Figure 13 depicts the changes in median
anonymity set size over time. The median for both BW
design and AS design decrease over time. Because we do
not rotate guards and do not consider user churn in our
simulations, new guard sets have few users and small
anonymity set sizes. The sizes decrease particularly fast
from September, which corresponds to when the number
of guard ASes starts increasing most rapidly.
Set Bandwidth. To ensure network performance re-
mains similar to Tor, we must ensure that guard band-
width is distributed relatively evenly over guard sets.
To do this, we test whether all guard sets have an ac-
cumulative bandwidth above a certain threshold.
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Figure 14 shows the CDF of bandwidths among the
guard sets in AS design and BW design and among indi-
vidual guard relays in Single Guard. The results for AS
design and BW design are similar, though AS design has
more high-bandwidth guard sets. This is because it does
not break up a high-bandwidth guard into multiple sets
the way that BW design does. Note that AS design re-
tains good load balancing in this case by having clients
pick their guard sets with a weight for bandwidth.
Figure 15 shows the median guard set bandwidth
over time in AS design and BW design and the median
guard relay bandwidth for Single Guard. The average of
the median guard set bandwidths over the year 2015 are
34 MBps and 49 MBps for AS design and BW design,
respectively. Although we used the same bandwidth
thresholds τup and τdown as Hayes and Danezis [18], BW
design’s guard sets tend to have more bandwidth be-
cause bandwidth is the primary consideration for man-
aging guard sets. In AS design, network location is the
primary consideration and bandwidth is secondary.
Performance. To evaluate the performance of the
guard selection mechanisms, we simulate them using
Shadow [5, 22], a discrete-event network simulator that
runs real applications like Tor and BitCoin on a single
machine. Using Shadow, we simulate Single Guard, AS
design, and BW design on a Tor network with 742 relays
(including 152 guard relays) and 2700 clients (including
2280 web clients). Details about the Shadow configura-
tion and simulation setup can be found in Appendix G.
The median of the times to download the first byte
(TTFB) for clients are 0.55, 0.55, and 0.56 seconds in
AS design, Single Guard, and BW design, respectively.
Thus, the responsiveness is about the same in all three
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approaches. The median times to download the last byte
for web clients (TTLB) are 1.221, 1.185, and 1.183 sec-
onds in BW design, AS design, and Single Guard, re-
spectively. Here, all the mechanisms have almost the
same throughput.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the implications of our find-
ings and the scope for future work. Further discussion
about the guard rotation can be found in Appendix C.
Deployment. To implement guard sets in Tor, the Tor
directory authorities would be responsible for building
and disseminating the guard sets. In particular, they
would use information on p2c links from CAIDA [3] to
identify customer cones and build the tree structure of
AS design, including Root Sets, Branch Sets, and Guard
Sets. They then ship the information about the design
structure such as list of Root Sets, Branch Sets, Guard
Sets, and which guard relays are in the Guard Sets to
the clients using the consensus documents. The clients
will get the information about the guard sets through
the consensus documents. Then clients only need to pick
their guard set using the algorithm mentioned in Sec-
tion 4.5. We propose a format for adding guard set in-
formation to the documents in Appendix B. We used
this format to add the guard set information to consen-
sus documents for 2015. We observed that the average
document size increased 3% (from 1.507 to 1.550 MB).
Since not all Tor clients will upgrade at once, some
degree of incremental deployment is needed. One ap-
proach is to have the directory servers provide just the
existing consensus documents to older clients and the
additional guard set information to upgraded clients. To
prevent a major partitioning of clients into anonymity
sets based on different behavior, Tor can wait until many
clients have upgraded before setting a flag that initi-
ates the use of guard sets. It may be best if transition
to guard sets happens slowly, as users could continue
with their current guards and not rotate from them
prematurely. Beyond this, further studies should be con-
ducted on the topic of incremental deployment to un-
derstand the impact of different transition strategies on
the anonymity of users and performance of the system.
Orphan guard ASes. There are some cases in which
guard ASes are isolated in a customer cone by them-
selves. In such cases, our algorithm may not be able to
group these guard ASes with other guard ASes, forcing
them to form smaller guard sets. If these sets do not
offer enough bandwidth, they pose a risk for guard fin-
gerprinting. To mitigate this issue, we can ignore these
low bandwidth guard sets until enough guard relays join
the network such that the low bandwidth guard sets will
be merged to form a sufficiently high bandwidth guard
set. In our one-year simulations, we observed a median
of two such ASes and a maximum of six ASes, and the
median bandwidth of these ASes were 3.6 MBps.
AS relationships and customer cones. Customer
cones are not as simple in practice as the tree model
would suggest. Given the CAIDA AS relationship graph,
which itself is not completely accurate, the cones must
be inferred based on some assumptions. For our work,
we apply the recursive customer algorithm [12, 27] (see
§2.1). Other approaches might yield different results,
but the key feature we need is that the attacker cannot
add guards to arbitrary points in the hierarchy. Issues
such as accuracy of the cones and the presence of p2p
traffic passing through IXPs should not affect our over-
all findings much because they affect the AS graph but
not the relative stability and hierarchical nature of the
AS graph that is being exploited by the proposed tech-
nique.
We note that relying on a single organization such
as CAIDA to form customer cones may be vulnerable
to attacks on the organization or its information. Fur-
ther thinking and experimentation should be performed
before deploying these techniques in Tor.
To evaluate the risk of AS-level adversaries, we used
Qiu and Gao AS-level path inference [34]. Although this
type of inference can be inaccurate in identifying all of
the ASes on a path [25], Barton and Wright report that
it is 90% accurate in identifying the eight most common
ASes that appear on both ends of a Tor path [9]. Fur-
ther, they find that these eight ASes account for about
98% of all instances of an AS appearing on both ends of
a Tor path. Thus, our findings both with and without
DeNASA should provide a reasonably accurate estimate
of the risk of network-level attacks.
Finally, we note that IP-to-AS mapping is not per-
fect. BGP is not secure, which can be leveraged for at-
tacks on Tor [35]. Thus, it can be similarly attacked to
undermine the AS design, and the importance of this
requires further investigation.
Virtual Hosting. AS design takes advantage of this
fact that the placement of guard relays in a given AS is
harder than manipulating the bandwidth, which is the
approach offered by BW design. There are some organi-
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zations and hosting providers like OVH that contribute
a significant fraction of guard relays to the Tor network.
Table 1 in Appendix A shows the top 20 organizations
running guard relays. The adversary can run a guard re-
lay on hosting provider like OVH and get into the guard
sets built based on OVH’s AS. This allows the adver-
sary to target those guard sets beyond what we have
discussed in this paper. On the other hand, for a large
provider like OVH, there will be multiple guard sets,
and no single one can be targeted. Further, the adver-
sary does remain confined to his Branch Set and Root
Set. Closer examination of this issue is needed before
AS design can be deployed in Tor.
DoS Within Sets. In AS design, if the client’s guard
set is dismantled, the client will select another Guard
Set from her Branch Set. This confines the adversary
better to her Branch Set and limits the number of clients
the attacker can compromise. On the other hand, the
adversary can DoS other Guard Sets in the same Branch
Set and force their clients to pick her Guard Set. This
can be limited by picking the new guard set from a larger
region in the network, such as anywhere in the Root Set.
Since this creates more opportunities for the adversary
to compromise guard sets, and since DoS attacks are
active and detectable, we argue that it is better to select
from the Branch Set instead.
7 Conclusion
The guard selection mechanism in Tor has a signifi-
cant impact on users’ security. Using guard sets help
to mitigate the threat of guard fingerprinting attacks.
The previously proposed BW design used guard band-
widths to form guard sets, and we showed that it has
both fundamental problems and specific design issues
that enable an adversary controlling only 1% of guard
relay bandwidth to compromise up to 40% of all clients.
We then proposed the AS design that groups the guard
relays based on the network topology. Through exten-
sive evaluations, we showed that this approach offers
stronger protections against compromise with similar
performance and system characteristics.
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A Hosting Providers
Organization BW Relays ASes VPS
ONLINE S.A.S. 4511 141 1 X
OVH SAS 4110 227 1 X
Hetzner Online GmbH 2745 122 1 X
Digital Ocean, Inc. 1367 63 7 X
myLoc managed IT AG 813 28 1 X
SURFnet 674 9 1 ×
SG. GS 610 6 1 ×
LeaseWeb Netherlands 489 18 2 ×
domainfactory GmbH 438 16 1 X
Init7 (Switzerland) Ltd 404 12 1 ×
ISPpro Internet KG 336 17 1 X
Contabo GmbH 240 17 1 X
ITL Company 203 13 2 ×
Strato AG 195 12 1 X
SoftLayer Tech. Inc. 188 12 2 X
PlusServer AG 186 12 1 X
Cogent Com. 184 6 1 ×
SUNET Swedish Uni 178 6 1 ×
Free SAS 162 7 1 ×
WorldStream 162 5 1 X
Table 1. Top 20 organizations, sorted by bandwidth, running
guard relays in Sept. 1, 2015. We used CAIDA dataset to map
the ASes to the organizations [2]. The columns are the organiza-
tion’s name, the organization’s bandwidth, the number of relays,
the number of ASes on the organization, and whether the organi-
zation is a VPS or Not.
B Consensus document
As we mentioned in Section 6, the directory authorities
can build the guard sets and ship them to the clients
through the consensus documents. We propose the fol-
lowing format for adding the guard set’s information
to the consensus documents. This format is compatible
with the formats used in consensus documents explained
in [6].
Each router entry in the consensus documents con-
tains a set of items. Each item sits in a separate line
which is started with an identifier. To include the guard
set information to the consensus documents, we add one
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more item for each guard relay. This item has the fol-
lowing format:
"g" SP ROOTSET-ID SP BRANCHSET-ID SP GUARDSET-ID
NL
Where:
"g" = the identifier.
SP = white space.
ROOTSET-ID = 16–digit unique Root Set identity.
BRANCHSET-ID = 16–digit unique Branch Set identity.
GUARDSET-ID = 16–digit unique Guard Set identity.
NL = new line.
We used this format to add the guard set information
to consensus documents in the year 2015. We observed
that the average document size was increased 43 Kbytes
(from 1.507 to 1.550 Mbytes).
C Further Discussion
Guard set rotation. Like Hayes and Danezis [18], we
did not include guard set rotation in our system since
clients may rotate to malicious guard sets [24]. On the
other hand, without guard set rotation, old guard sets
will collect more users over time compared to new guard
sets. Moreover, we do not let compromised clients regain
their privacy by rotating their guard sets. This trade-
off also exists in other guard selection schemes. In Tor’s
single guard selection policy, the client should rotate her
guard every 9 to 10 months. This guard rotation period
is long enough that guard rotations are significantly re-
duced, yet compromised clients eventually regain their
privacy. Such a guard rotation policy can also be applied
to the guard set designs. We can also consider an age
metric for guard sets that keeps the number of clients
from growing too much in old guard sets.
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Fig. 16. Daily guard bandwidth throughout 2015
E DeNASA Implementation
DeNASA [9] is a recently proposed AS-aware path se-
lection algorithm. It avoids paths with suspect ASes,
mainly Tier 1 ASes that appear frequently on the entry
and exit sides of Tor traffic. The main advantage of this
approach is that it is destination-naive, which enables
Tor to preemptively build circuits for performance rea-
sons. The downside of DeNASA is that it is vulnerable
to leakage about a client’s AS across repeated connec-
tions [23].
We implemented the g&e-select algorithm intro-
duced by DeNASA. In combining DeNASA with guard
set designs, the client first picks a guard set (or a guard
relay in Single Guard) in such a way that is defined in
each guard selection mechanism. If there is a suspect
AS on the AS path between the client and any of the
guards in the chosen guard set, the client drops that set
and tries another guard set. Otherwise, she keeps the
guard set. At the time of building a circuit, DeNASA
picks a guard relay from the chosen guard set; then it
picks an exit relay such that Tor picks, if the proba-
bility of appearing suspect ASes existing on the entry
path (the AS path between the client and and the guard
relay) is less than a threshold, the chosen exit is accept-
able. Otherwise, it tries another exit relay. We set the
probability threshold to 0.1 in our simulations. .
The suspect ASes for the entry side, the suspect
ASes which appear more frequently on the path between
the clients and guard relays, are :{ 1299, 3356 }.
The suspect ASes for the exit side, the suspect ASes
which appear more frequently on the path between the
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exit relays and destinations, are :{ 1299, 3356, 6939, 174,
2914, 3257, 9002, 6453 }.
The probability table is the input to DeNASA algo-
rithm. The rows in the table are exit ASes, which have
exit relays, and columns are the suspect ASes. In the
table, each value Pij represents the probability of ap-
pearing suspect AS j on the AS paths between exit AS
i and the possible destinations. We considered the pos-
sible destinations all the destinations visited by TorPS
typical user model.
F Algorithms
input : Guard ASes, customer-provider graph,
τup,N
output: Root Sets
%initialization;
RootSetlist ← Guard ASes;
RootSetlist ← SORT ascending RootSetlist based
on their customer cone size;
while TRUE do
RootSetcurrent ← RootSetlist.pop(0);
providers list ← GET RootSetcurrent’s
providers from customer-provider graph;
providers list ← SORT ascending providers list
based on their customer cone size;
for provider ∈ providers list do
for RootSet ∈ RootSetlist do
if RootSet ∈ provider.cone then
DELETE RootSet from
RootSetlist;
APPEND provider to RootSetlist;
BREAK;
end
end
end
if length(RootSetlist) < NRootSet then
BREAK
end
HIGH BW SETS ← 0;
for RootSet ∈ RootSetlist do
if RootSet.bw > τup then
HIGH BW SETS ←
HIGH BW SETS + 1;
end
end
if HIGH BW SETS == length(RootSetlist)
then
BREAK;
end
end
Algorithm 1: The algorithm building RootSet
input : Root Sets, customer-provider graph
output: Guard Set
Function Selection(list):
totalbw ← 0.0;
rand ∈ random(0, totalbw);
for item ∈ list do
totalbw += item.bandwidth;
end
rand ← random(0, totalbw);
tmp ← 0.0;
for item ∈ list do
tmp+= item.bandwidth;
if tmp > rand then
return item;
end
end
end
RootSet ← Selection(RootSets);
BranchSet ←
Selection(RootSet.BranchSets);
guardset ←
Selection(BranchSet.GuardSets);
return guardset,BranchSet,RootSet;
Algorithm 2: Picking guard set
G Shadow Configuration
In our Shadow simulations, we follow Tor modeling pro-
cedure suggested by Jansen et al. [20]. We used Tor
version 2.4.26 (released in March 2015) and modified
it to implement AS and BW designs. Shadow comes
with some validated tools that use the data from Tor
Metrics [36] and generates the private Tor network. We
found a problem in one of the Shadow’s tools which
was affecting the computing of the relays load. We fixed
the problem and reported it. Using those tools and Tor
Metric data from April 2015 (one month after the re-
lease of Tor version 2.4.26), we generated a Tor network
with 742 relays (including 152 guards, 63 exits, 5 Au-
thorities, 40 exitguards, and 482 middles) 800 HTTP
servers, 2700 clients (2280 web clients, 120 bulk clients,
and 300 Shadowperf clients).
Shadow runs the actual Tor source code over a sim-
ulated Internet topology. The default Internet topol-
ogy shipped by Shadow is very small, with 183 ver-
tices and 17,000 edges, which makes this topology not
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Fig. 17. Performance Results. The performance evaluation of guard selection mechanisms.
a good representative of the Internet. For our simula-
tions, we used the topology used by Jansen et al. [21].
This topology is built by techniques from recent studies
in modeling Tor network [20, 24], and the data from Tor
Metrics [36], CAIDA [3], and Alexa [1]. This topology
contains 699,029 vertices and 1,338,590 edges. Shadow
developer Rob Jansen provided us this topology that
uses a latency-based packet loss model where the higher
latency equals higher packet loss.
Figures 17 shows the performance results for dif-
ferent guard selection mechanisms and compares them
with TorPerf clients [4]. As shown in the figure all ap-
proaches have the same performance results. The me-
dian of the time to download the first byte is almost
0.55 seconds for all the approaches (it is 0.68 seconds in
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(Single Guard) with live Tor perf. clients
TorPerf clients). The median of the download time for
320KiB objects is around 1.2 seconds for all approaches
which is between 1.06 seconds (the median of download
time of 50KiB-TorPerf clients) and 3.2 seconds (the me-
dian of download time of 1MiB-TorPerf clients). In our
simulations, AS design built 58 guard sets and BW de-
sign built 50 guard sets, they built 394 and 275 guard
sets, respectively, in April 15, 2015, the day we used the
data to generate our private Tor network.
